<p>The USAF reacted by adding the two remaining B-29 squadrons of the 301st BG to the one already at Furstenfeldbruck for rotational training, and deployed two more B-29 groups—60 bombers—to British bases. Then USAF announced that a wing of Lockheed F-80 fighters would be moving from the Canal Zone to Germany in August. On 20 July, 16 F-80s from the 56th Fighter Group, Selfridge AFB, Michigan, landed in England on their way to take up station at Furstenfeldbruck, near Munich in the US zone.
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<p>By then, the 'LeMay Coal & Feed Delivery Service' had passed the 1,000-ton daily delivery mark. There was a belief in higher headquarters that the operation ought to be taken out of LeMay's hands and given to the Military Air Transport Service. The organization was the airlift specialist, by charter, and LeMay's forte was combat operations. If the Russians were to make an overt move, he would have his hands full with the fighting, and the airlift operations would necessarily have to take second place.
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<p>On 23 July, the Airlift Task Force was established by MATS on orders from USAF Headquarters. MATS dispatched eight squadrons of C-54 Skymaster transports to Germany; 72 planes, with three crews for each. The airlift was about to change markedly.
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<p>Major General William H. Tunner was director of the ATF, and immediately organized a staff and went to Germany to take over from LeMay. "I expect you to produce," said LeMay. Said Tunner, never at a loss for a pithy statement, "I intend to."
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<p>Tunner later described the situation he had inherited as "...a real cowboy operation." Flight and ground crews were unscheduled. The C-47s were in poor shape. Utilization was low. Maintenance time was high. The air routes were very restrictive; Templehof and Gatow were four minutes apart by air, and seven Russian airfields surrounded Berlin. There was no room to maneuver, and holding patterns were overhead at each field. Templehof had no runways; the Germans had flown from the sod field, and pierced steel planking had been laid down later for USAFE operations.
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<p>The key, Tunner knew, was high utilization. It was much easier operationally to use a smaller number of larger planes and make the maximum number of trips with them. It simplified traffic control and ground handling, but it added to the maintenance load, because the increased number of takeoffs and landings was bound to raise some hell with engines and tires. No matter; that could be handled. Go for utilization.
